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Abstract: Visualising complex data facilitates a more comprehensive stage for conveying 
knowledge. Within the medical data domain, there is an increasing requirement for valuable and 
accurate information. Patients need to be confident that their data is being stored safely and 
securely. As such, it is now becoming necessary to visualise data patterns and trends in real-time 
to identify erratic and anomalous network access behaviours. In this paper, an investigation into 
modelling data flow within healthcare infrastructures is presented; where a dataset from a 
Liverpool-based (UK) hospital is employed for the case study. Specifically, a visualisation of 
transmission control protocol (TCP) socket connections is put forward, as an investigation into the 
data complexity and user interaction events within healthcare networks. In addition, a filtering 
algorithm is proposed for noise reduction in the TCP dataset. Positive results from using this 
algorithm are apparent on visual inspection, where noise is reduced by up to 89.84%. 
Keywords: medical device; healthcare infrastructures; data visualisation; network visualisation; 
cyber security; network security; advanced data analytics; hospital networks 
 
1. Introduction 
Hospital infrastructures are classified as mission-critical infrastructures [1]. These information 
infrastructures have become increasingly dependent on information and communication 
technologies (ICT) to facilitate communication and automate services [2]. Therefore hospitals are 
predominantly information technology (IT) infrastructures, with an increasing reliance on 
electronic patient record (EPR) data [3]. Damage to network communications and losing patient 
data would have a detrimental impact on the healthcare services they provide. However, as with 
any other network, they are now more vulnerable to cyber-attackers.  
1.1. Motivating Scenario 
Hospital networks are frequently upgraded with new digital technologies, rather than being 
replaced, due to the cost involved with new developments. The security implications mean that 
unique custom-written systems, also known as bespoke systems, need to be put in place to 
safeguard and protect data. However, the reliance on legacy software, and small scale bespoke 
security solutions, result is an increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks from external sources [4]. For 
example, London hospitals lost all network connectivity due to several malware infection by the 
MyTob worm that occurred at the end of 2008 [5]. In 2005, a Chicago hospital lost its entire 
pharmacy database, and in order to reconstruct medication records for its patients, paper printouts 
were required to be collected from nursesȂ stations [6]. And in October 2016 a UK Hospital in 
Lincolnshire was shut down for four days by a variant of the Globe2 ransomware [7], with all 
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planned operations, outpatient appointments and diagnostic procedures cancelled, with patients 
turned away and 2800 patient appointments cancelled because of the disruption.  
This risk is further exacerbated by the bring-your-own-devices (BYOD) revolution. This is a 
term referring to the technologies enabling employees to access and utilise internal corporate IT 
resources, with their personal devices [8]. BYOD policies have numerous benefits including 
reduced costs and improved productivity, convenience and efficiency of work, as such a significant 
amount of users require access to patient records to facilitate their occupation. Healthcare 
infrastructures may also involve temporary employees or visitors from partner organisations. The 
BYOD approach also means that users from visiting healthcare organisations have access to 
hospital networks and the Internet. However, this also carries numerous risks including data 
loss/leakage or theft, application security, network availability, legal liability and regulatory 
compliance and loss of brand identity, posing various challenges for IT departments who support 
and secure [8]. BYOD is a large contributor to the era of ubiquitous computing, also known as 
pervasive computing, where various technologies interact with one another, with potentially 
sensitive data being transmitted over less secure means of communication, such as wirelessly [9]. 
With an increased use of technology there is a corresponding risk of increased exposure to cyber 
security threats. These wireless vulnerabilities pose a particular risk to the healthcare network, in 
that potentially insecure devices are granted access to hospital infrastructure and confidential data. 
An attacker can use this to their advantage by hacking a BYOD to gain back-door access onto a 
hospital network.  
1.2. Problem Statement and Contributions 
This paper presents an investigation in to health care data patterns using a real-world hospital 
dataset. The data is comprised of transmission control protocol (TCP) socket connections to three 
different servers offering an electronic prescribing (EP) system, a patient administration system 
(PAS) an active directory domain controller (DC). Data is collected from a Liverpool-based hospital, 
in the UK. The exact hospital is not specified to comply with data protection rules at the request of 
the partner hospital and due to the sensitive nature of the information. The dataset is analysed and 
low-risk data points present are removed using our proposed algorithm. The investigation then 
provides a recommendation for a visualisation approach to analyse cyber-transactions and traffic, 
which assists information security officers within healthcare organisations to improve the 
situational awareness of cyber security risks. The algorithm is evaluated using three visualisation 
techniques, (1) force-directed visualisation algorithms, (2) logarithmic heatmaps and (3) 
nonparametric statistical graphics. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time this approach 
has been applied to this hospital network dataset. The proposed algorithm demonstrates a novel 
technique that is able to remove noise by up to 89.84%. Through removing noise, situational 
awareness of the network is improved. Therefore, analyst attention can be focus on the most 
pertinent events for investigation. By presenting network data, in such a way as to highlight 
anomalies and identify relationships between data points, this work can be built upon. The 
ambition of this work is that other researchers are able to build on these techniques to advance 
anomaly detection within healthcare infrastructures. 
1.3. Structure 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
background research on industrial networks, healthcare security and visualisation techniques. 
Section 3 outlines our investigation methodology for analysing data within healthcare 
infrastructures, processing it to eliminate low-risk data points and visualising it in such a way that 
data anomalies become apparent. Section 4 presents our visualisation case study and a sample of 
the test data. Section 5 provide a discussion and evaluates the results of our investigation. Section 6 
discusses conclusions of the presented work and paves the way for future research work. 
2. Background Research 
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There is a tendency for organisational complacency towards the risks of cyber security [10]. 
Issues of reduced information visibility due to data complexity, fragmentation, interoperability and 
lack of specialisation, all undermine the security of these organisations [10]. Yet, visualisation 
techniques provide both awareness and modelling capabilities for the benefit of computing in 
critical infrastructures [11]. Organisations need to bridge the gap between cyber operations, 
resilience and the priorities of the business. Besides, information security officers and IT managers 
need to synthesise highly disparate data into a coherent and concise narrative [10].  
The goal of security engineers is to develop tools capable of detecting malicious, multi-stage 
intrusion attacks, weighting the individual attacks, and comparing them against the enormous and 
disparate database of attacks within the network [12]. This is a ȁplain recognition’ problem and an 
intruderȂs objectives should be determined based on the analysis of the entire dataset of attacks as a 
whole, rather than just an individual attack [13]. As such, in this section, a background discussion is 
put forward on the layout of medical infrastructures and the existing healthcare network security 
challenges. This background aids with the development of an approach to understanding the 
overall network behaviour.  
2.1. Structure 
Healthcare organisations have sensitive data spread across several devices. Mobile devices, 
such as laptops or tablets, are all used for inputting medical data. Specialised devices, such as 
Draeger patient monitoring systems, require network connectivity. In result, healthcare network 
security challenges can be summarised into four categories: system structure, mobile device, 
medical equipment and user-based challenges. ȃSystem structureȄ refers to the vulnerabilities in 
the physical system layout; mobile device challenges relate to issues surrounding on-demand 
network access; medical equipment challenges concern low security in medical and biomedical 
devices. Finally, user-based challenges refer to the general staff-awareness of existing cyber-threats 
or good cyber-security practices. For example, a hospital staff member may unsuspectingly click on 
a link in an email, which contains a Trojan virus and creates a back door into the hospital network.  
Healthcare organisations differ from other enterprise networks through their use of medical 
cyber-physical systems (MCPSs). MCPSs are inexpensive personal monitoring devices that can 
record and transmit multiple physiological signals [14]. Encryption of this data is required for 
secure storage, secure transmission, and secure computation. MCPSs are comprised of four layers, 
which need to be considered and secured. (1) The data acquisition layer has a body area network 
(BAN), which are wearable sensors which facilitate the collection of patient medical information. (2) 
The data concentration/aggregation layer, consisting of transmitting the gathered information to a 
gateway server through short range wireless, such as Bluetooth, due to the low computational 
power of sensors with a BAN. (3) The cloud processing and storage layer consist of the long-term 
secure storage, processing and analytics of medical information. (4) The action layer involves either 
active of passive use of the data. Active usage employs an actuator using the data and the 
algorithms used to perform data analytics to be directly influenced by the data, such as through the 
use of a robotic arm in robot-assisted surgery. Passive action visualises the data to provide decision 
support to medical professionals [14]. 
Figure 1 presents a 3-layer network topology overview of how the Liverpool-based hospital 
network is configured. The diagram demonstrates the principle of how the network is configured; 
as in reality it is replicated several times over and therefore too substantial to fit on a single 
diagram. The diagram shows the network layers involved between the server layer and the access 
layer, and demonstrates that they are duplicated throughout in order to provide network resilience. 
The servers connect to the server switch, providing the server access layer of the network topology 
(aka the application layer). This then connects to the distribution layer, also known the transport 
layer. The transport layer connects to the core layer or the Internet layer, providing access to 
routing, wireless and the firewall. This then again connects to another distribution/transport layer, 
which finally connects to the network access layer where networked devices connect to the 
network. 
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Figure 1. 3-layer network topology. 
Figure 2 presents an overview of the Liverpool-based network infrastructure for enabling 
remote access within the hospital. The layout enables staff the ability to work together and provide 
on-call services remotely. The blueprint demonstrates the locations of the LANs and VLANs within 
a typical hospital network. In addition, the firewall placements, in relation to the Internet, are 
depicted. Figure 2 also displays the relationship between a hospitalȂs typical ȁcommunity of interest 
networkȂ (CoIN)/WAN and the N3 (a WAN used to connect many sites across the UK National 
Health Service). 
The system layout leaves a vulnerability to attackers being able to eavesdrop on traffic 
between the network controller and the supervisor in particular. From there, messages can be 
injected, replay attacks can be performed, such as maliciously replaying or delaying a valid data 
transmission, and spoof messages can be generated [12]. In doing so, it is possible to compromise 
the integrity of the device operation [15]. If successful, patient privacy would be invaded and 
legitimate data supressed. This compromises patient privacy whilst attempting not to interfere with 
medical device operation. 
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Figure 2. Network infrastructure for remote access. 
2.2. Security Challenges 
Security threats within healthcare have farther reaching implications for healthcare than other 
industries [16]. Due to the increased adoption of trends such as the use of mobile, social and cloud, 
the ease for hackers to infiltrate the healthcare infrastructure massively increases [16]. The 
boundaries for healthcare systems are evolving, with many patients having the option of accessing 
their healthcare data from home PCs and mobile devices which increase the attack surface 
significantly. Medical data must be private, with data misuse and violation detected in order for to 
release and share data to authorised parties and public institutions [17]. 
Medical devices are used for innovative solutions to find a cure, enabling quality of life and 
improving efficiency in patient care [16]. However, these devices, in particular sensors within the 
body, have limited resources and therefore inadequate capabilities to self-protect. Traditional 
approaches to endpoint security are no longer viable in the modern threat landscape [16]. Attack 
models have changed, from attacks on single PCs, to large-scale attacks on entities through 
advanced persistent threats. Such attacks involve zero data exploits; spear phishing, watering hole 
models and encrypted side channel methods to infect systems. In addition to attacking systems, 
modern malware have adopted and evolved evasion techniques, such as malware packing, 
obfuscation and polymorphism [16]. Modern malware models in healthcare scenarios become 
particularly malicious [16]. Techniques, such as ransomware, which restricts access to computer 
systems and demands a ransom for the restriction to be removed, can be life threatening in 
healthcare scenarios. 
Scanning attacks involve adversaries perusing devices within the network to gather 
meaningful information to launch a sophisticated attack upon an infrastructure [18]. These scans 
commonly include, IP address scanning, port scanning and version scanning. Health Level 7 (HL7) 
is an interoperable standard which allows disparate healthcare application store exchange, 
integrate, share and retrieve clinical and administrative data [18]. With regard to healthcare 
infrastructures, an adversary can carry out segment scanning on HL7 information to learn personal 
identifiers, order numbers or patient visit information [18]. Spoofing attacks involve malicious 
users masquerading as legitimate [18]. Masquerading is a passive spoofing attack where attackers 
exhilarate legitimate account credentials and then log in. Impersonation is an active spoofing attack, 
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sometimes known as a replay attack, wherein attackers capture authentication traffic and replay the 
traffic to gain access to the healthcare infrastructure. 
Injection attacks involve exploiting vulnerabilities of structured query language (SQL), 
JavaScript and other computer programs to successfully insert untrusted data [18]. In doing so, 
attackers may gain access to healthcare databases, attack web users and to propagate viruses. 
Additionally, they may inject malicious segments commands or responses to reduce the security of 
healthcare infrastructures. Broken authentication and session management involve attackers 
exploiting vulnerabilities in authentication mechanisms to assume the identities of legitimate users 
[18]. A brute force attack is an example that takes advantage of weak passwords and small 
encryption keys, ultimately allowing a malicious user to perform all the functions available to a 
legitimate user. Denial of service attacks (DoS) involve exhausting system and network resources to 
make them unavailable [18]. For example, a flooding-based DoS sends a large number of packets to 
a web server, in doing so, legitimate requests are blocked as the CPU is overwhelmed. 
Cyber-threat monitoring systems employ intrusion detection systems (IDSs) as network 
sensors [19]. IDSs statistically analyse the time of the attack, the source of the attack, the destination 
of the attack, and can visualise the result. Visualisations are used in order to leverage the perceptual 
abilities of the user, in order to find features in network structures and data. To process datasets, 
visualisation algorithms are employed to understand stand-out behaviours. 
Security is crucial to the long-term viability of networked medical devices [15]. These medical 
devices have the potential to be tampered with, reprogrammed by unauthorised users or subject to 
device-specific hazards. Devices can be targeted through their firmware upgrades or through 
connections to the network interface when connected through remote attacks in addition to local 
attacks. For example, telemetry data of an implantable cardiac defibrillator can be read and 
reprogrammed remotely [15]. There are obvious physical hazards and privacy implications for 
these attacks. Security concerns for implanted medical devices (IMDs) are particularly challenging 
due to the potential for patient injury or death due to adversarial tampering [20]. Additionally, 
high-profile medical device malfunctioning could cause loss of life due to network compromise or 
medical device tampering. To detect abnormal data behaviours, visualisation techniques can be 
used to provide both awareness and modelling capabilities for the benefit of computing in critical 
infrastructures [11]. Data analytics enables meaningful inferences to be extracted from raw data, 
and facilitates cost savings and faster decision support [21]. Visualisation techniques allow an 
analyst to visualise abnormalities in a dataset due to the shape or colour of data patterns, and to do 
so quickly and efficiently [22]. 
The challenges facing healthcare security are as follows, a lack of labelled data from previous 
attacks; constantly evolving attacks and analystȂs limited investigative time and budget [23]. 
Current solutions employ either analyst driven solutions, or unsupervised machine learning 
solutions. Both of these solutions are not sufficient on their own. Analyst driven solutions often 
lead to a high number of false negatives, due to their reliance on human judgement, besides delays 
between attack detection and the implementation of countermeasures [23]. Similarly, unsupervised 
machine learning solutions are insufficient due to their high number of false positive alarms, which 
lead to alarm fatigue and distrust by analysts [23]. 
The data used in this paper is real-world network data from a Liverpool-based hospital 
network employing over 4,000 staff. The data collected is a snapshot of the network infrastructure 
using the network statistics (netstat) command-line in order to capture incoming and outgoing 
transmission control protocol (TCP) data. TCP data was captured as it allows for two hosts to 
establish a connection and exchange data streams. This TCP data was captured using the netstat 
command with the command line utility. This was done for ease of use and data simplicity to 
demonstrate the proof-of-concept. In future work, the intention is to use information rich data 
packets, captured using a packet sniffing network monitoring tool. As the investigation shows, the 
volume and type of data within healthcare infrastructures presents a significant challenge for 
security analytics.  
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AI2 is a cyber-security machine learning system, which improves its accuracy over time 
through feedback from security analysts [23]. AI2 consists of the following four components. Firstly, 
a big data processing system, which quantifies the behaviours and features of raw data [23]. 
Secondly, an outlier detection system, which learns a descriptive model of data features extracted 
via unsupervised learning, using either density, matrix decomposition or replicator neural 
networks [23]. Thirdly, a feedback mechanism and continuous learning, which incorporate analyst 
input through a user interface [23]. The system highlights the top k outlier events or entities and 
tasks the analyst with identifying whether they are malicious; the feedback is then input back into 
the supervised learning module. Fourthly, a supervised learning model, which predicts whether a 
new incoming event is normal or malicious, and uses analysts feedback to refine the model [23]. 
Raw data is input into AI2 which computes features describing the entities of the data set. Using 
these features, an unsupervised machine learning module identifies extreme and rare events in the 
data. These events are then ranked based upon a pre-defined metric and presented to the analyst, 
who ranks the behaviours as normal or malicious (and as pertaining to a particular attack type). 
Finally, these labels are input to the supervised learning module [23].  
2.3. Data 
In this section, a sample of TPC socket connection data from a real-world hospital is presented. 
A sample of netstat snapshot data conducted on three servers, the Active Directory Domain 
Controller, the Electronic Prescribing System and the Patient Administration System is presented. 
Additionally, for each dataset, the most recurring items for both local and foreign addresses are 
shown. The hospital has currently 274 servers, a combination of both physical and virtual servers, 
providing specialist applications and functions across the hospital network. The three servers used 
for the purpose of this proof-of-concept paper are chosen from two reasons; (1) they are the most 
active servers on the network, and (2) their potential value to a malicious attacker. For example, if 
the attacker is able to infiltrate the active directory domain controller, then they have access to an 
authentication certificate and access to the wider hospital network. By accessing the electronic 
prescribing system, the attacker has access large quantities of pharmaceutical drugs. Additionally, 
by accessing the patient administration system, intrinsically valuable and confidential medical data 
would be reachable. If an attacker were to, instead, attempt to shut down any of these servers 
through a DDoS attack, it could limit the ability of legitimate medical professionals to provide 
appropriate patient care and could potentially lead to patient harm. 
The data used for this research is a single snapshot of the domain controller server and 
comprises of 590 established connections of 5688 total ports. The data is gathered using the netstat 
command and is further discussed in section 5.1. In Table 1, a sample of analysed netstat data is 
shown displaying (i) the connection type, (ii) the IP source connecting to the DC, (iii) the target of 
the IP address (the DC server), and (iv) the state of the connection. All data presented is 
anonymised. The data is a single snapshot of the domain controller server and comprises of 590 
established connections of 5688 total ports. 
Table 1. Transmission control protocol (TCP) socket connections sample data (anonymised). 
Active Directory Domain Controller Electronic Prescribing System 
Proto Local address Foreign address State Proto Local address Foreign address State 
TCP 0.0.0.0:***** 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:***** 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 
TCP **.**.***.16:53 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP **.**.***.197:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 
TCP **.**.***.16:135 **.**.**.148:53173 ESTABLISHED TCP **.**.***.197:8194 **.**.***.133:50176 ESTABLISHED 
TCP **.**.***.16:135 **.**.***.51:63068 ESTABLISHED TCP **.**.***.197:8194 **.**.***.133:50326 ESTABLISHED 
TCP **.**.***.16:135 **.**.***.92:29550 ESTABLISHED TCP **.**.***.197:8194 **.**.***.133:50640 ESTABLISHED 
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In Table 1 a sample of the netstat data is shown, displaying the connection type, the IP source 
connecting to the EP, the target of the IP address (the EP server) and the state of the connection. The 
data is a single snapshot of the domain controller server and comprises 18 established connections 
of 88 total ports. 
3. Investigation Methodology 
As the background demonstrates, there is a clear need to address the lack of situational 
awareness by cyber security professionals within healthcare infrastructures. Therefore, in this 
section, several approaches are put forward for visualising data within healthcare infrastructures, 
in such a way that data anomalies become apparent. Visualising data highlights potentially 
malicious activity in a broad overview of the current network. From here, the analyst can explore 
the visualisation and the highlighted data points. Interaction with the visualisation allows in-depth 
exploration of the data, providing detailed technical information regarding the data points and 
providing insight as to why the data were ranked as potentially malicious by the advanced data 
analytics. Subsequently, the analyst can analyse and label the remaining data points as either 
normal or as pertaining to a particular attack signature, and in doing so provide a feedback loop, 
using advanced data analytics to improve continuously the data analysis and visualisation. As 
such, three visualisation techniques are investigated in this paper. The algorithms selected are 
considered standards for network visualisation, data exploration and map making [24]. 
Additionally there is a focus on live spatialisation, enabling the user to observe and understand 
network effects through interaction in real-time. 
3.1. Force Directed Visualisation Algorithm 
Force directed visualisation algorithms are regularly employed in a network visualisation 
setting. As such, the following visualisation algorithms are employed in this paper; ForceAtlas2 
[25], Yifan Fu [26] and Fruchterman-Reingold [27]. Both are force directed placement algorithms 
allowing the display complex graph structures, by sorting and placing nodes into structured 
topologies satisfying several visual requirements such as even distribution, symmetry, non-
overlapping edges and minimising distance between close nodes. ForceAtlas2, for example, is a 
force directed layout algorithm, simulating a physical system in order to specialise a network [25]. 
Nodes repulse one another and edges attract nodes, which ultimately creates a balanced state and 
allows for a visual representation of data structure. This enables data communities with denser 
relations to appear as groups of nodes.  
Yifan Fu is a graph drawing algorithm combining a multilevel approach, to overcome local 
minimums, and the BarnesȮHut octree technique, to approximate short and long-range forces [26]. 
Yifan Hu uses the repulsive forces on one node from a cluster of distant nodes. The algorithm uses a 
spring-electrical model to calculate both the attraction and repulsion forces to visually demonstrate 
the component nodes within a hospital network structure. The repulsive force is global and 
proportional to the inverse of the (physical) distance between vertices. The attractive force (the 
spring force) is only between neighboring vertices [26]. The effect of this is that one node may be 
attracted to two other nodes, but those nodes may be repelling each other. This leads to a stretching 
effect. 
The repulsion Fr formula is mathematically defined as: ܨ� = ݇݀2 (1) 
Here, d represents the distance between the two nodes, while the attraction Fa formula is 
expressed as: ܨ௔ = −݇ ∙ ݀ (2) 
Typically, this multilevel approach has three levels; 
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Algorithm 1—Yifan Hu Multilevel algorithm 
1) Coarsest Graph Layout, which is as modelled as follows: �݂ሺ݊^ሺ� + ͳሻ < ܯ�݊ܵ�ݖ݁݋ݎ݊^ሺ� + ͳሻ/݊^� > ݌ሻ{ ∗ ݔ^� ≔ ݎܽ݊݀݋݉�݊�ݐ�݈݈ܽܽݕ݋ݑݐ ∗ ݔ^� = ܨ݋ݎܿ݁ܦ�ݎ݁ܿݐ݁݀�݈݃݋ݎ�ݐℎ݉ሺܩ^�, ݔ^�, ݐ݋݈ሻ ∗ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݔ�} 
2) The Coarsening Phase, calculated as outlined: ݏ݁ݐݑ݌ݐℎ݁݊^� × ݊^ሺ� + ͳሻ݌ݎ݋݈݋݊݃ܽݐ�݋݊݉ܽݐݎ�ݔ�^� ܩ^ሺ� + ͳሻ = �^ሺ�^ܶሻܩ^��^� ݔ^ሺ� + ͳሻ = ܯݑ݈ݐ�݈݁ݒ݈݁ܮܽݕ݋ݑݐሺܩ^ሺ� + ͳሻ, ݐ݋݈ሻ 
and 3) the Prolongation and Refinement Phase, where prolongation is employed to acquire 
initial layout: ݔ^� = �^�ݔ^ሺ� + ͳሻ ݎ݂݁�݊݁݉݁݊ݐ: ݔ^� = ܨ݋ݎܿ݁ܦ�ݎ݁ܿݐ݁݀�݈݃݋ݎ�ݐℎ݉ሺܩ^�, ݔ^�, ݐ݋݈ሻ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݔ^� 
The starting point is the original graph, G0 = G and ni = | Vi | is the coefficient for the number of 
vertices in the ith level graph, represented as Gi. xi is defined as the coordinate vector for the 
vertices in Vi. Gi is represented by a symmetric matrix Gi, where all entries of the matrix act as the 
edge weights. Gi+1 to Gi is the continuation operator, also represented by a matrix Pi, of dimension ni 
* ni+1. 
Fruchterman-Reingold is an algorithm which produces undirected graphs through 
distributing vertices evenly, making edge lengths uniform and reflecting symmetry [27]. 
Furthermore, the following two principles are adhered to. Firstly, that vertices connected by an 
edge should be drawn near each other, and secondly, that vertices should not be drawn too close to 
each other [27]. In addition to these criteria, the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm adds even vertex 
distribution and treats vertices as atomic particles or celestial bodies, exerting attractive and 
repulsive force from one another [28]. In other words, the algorithm distributes vertices evenly, 
makes edge lengths uniform and reflects symmetry by placing spring-like attractive forces on each 
edge, and letting the system stabilise. The principles that the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm aim 
to achieve are, firstly, vertices connected by an edge should be drawn near each other, and 
secondly, vertices should not be drawn too close to each other (depending on how many there are 
and how much space is available) [27]. The algorithm is considered a standard in graph-drawing 
algorithms. The Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm is an iterative algorithm determining the position 
of all the nodes and the distance between the nodes connected by an edge, using the sum of force 
vectors to calculate the direction and distance a node should be moved at each step, and updating 
the forces between them, until stability (i.e. minimum energy) is reached.  
The distance between two vertices d and the optimal distance between two vertices k is defined 
as: ݇ = ܥ√ ܽݎ݁ܽ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ݋݂ݒ݁ݎݐ�ܿ݁ݏ (3) 
where C is the constant to be found experimentally and represents the width step a node is 
moved at each iteration. 
The Fruchterman-Reingold attractive force is defined as: 
௔݂ሺ݀ሻ = ݀2/݇ (4) 
The Fruchterman-Reingold repulsive force is defined as: 
�݂ሺ݀ሻ = −݇2/݀ (5) 
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Finally, OpenOrd is an open-source graph-drawing algorithm specialised for drawing large-
scale real-world graphs incorporating edge-cutting, a multi-level approach, average-link clustering 
and a parallel implementation of a force-directed method [29]. It is based upon an implementation 
of the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm known as the VxOrd. All of these visualisation algorithms 
are employed and evaluated as part of the data processing techniques outlined in the following 
methodology. 
3.2. Logarithmic Heatmaps 
Logarithmic heatmaps are an effective way of presenting data with significant value ranges. By 
converting values to their logarithm, it is possible to display changes that happen across disparate 
scales. A visualisation is typically constructed using a logarithmic algorithm, outlined in (9). ݂ሺݔሻ = ݈݋݃௕ሺݔሻ (6) 
Where the base b logarithm of x is equal to f(x). Lower-scale values are not compressed down 
into the congested section of the graph where the unique values would be challenging to identify. 
In this sense, a logarithmic heat-map is appropriate as the log scales enable a significant range of 
coefficients to be displayed.  
3.3. Nonparametric Statistical Graphics 
Nonparametric statistical graphs, are data visualisations where the dataset is not required to fit 
a normal distribution. For example, the techniques may make use of data which does not 
necessarily contain numbers, but rather ordinal data. Nonparametric statistical approaches are ideal 
for settings in which data might have no clear numerical interpretation. The two techniques 
employed in this research involve the use of boxplots and Sankey diagrams to visualise the TCP 
socket connection counts. A boxplot requires five components of information, the lowest value (L), 
lower quartiles (Q1), median (Q2), upper quartile (Q3) and the highest value (H). A Sankey diagram 
is typically used to show a visualisation of flow quantity, where the width of the arrows are 
proportionate to the flow measure.  
In the following section, a case study is presented, which is comprised of a visualisation of the 
TCP-socket data, using each of the techniques outlined in this section. 
4. Visualisation Case Study 
In this section, various visualisation techniques are implemented on the dataset to determine 
the best method of visualising hospital network data. The four techniques are (1) force-directed 
layout algorithms, (2) heatmaps, (3) boxplots and (4) Sankey diagrams. 
4.1. Force-Directed Layout Algorithms 
Visualisations the hospital’s active directory domain controller are presented in Figure 3a,b. 
The visualisations presented are of the raw data connections for the PAS system at the Liverpool 
hospital. The nodes, depicted by black circles, represent devices connecting to the domain 
controller. In Figure 3a, the algorithm performed on the data is a ForceAtlas2 [25,30]. The 
fundamentals of ForceAtlas2 are intended to be simplistic, nodes repulse and edges attract 
continuously, while the layout is running and can be manipulated by the user while running. This 
ȁliveȂ spatialisation provides the user with an intuitive understanding of the layout process, whilst 
allowing the user to employ a trialȮerror approach in exploring the data. Figure 3b displays the 
algorithm performed on the data using the Yifan Hu Multilevel layout [26]. In this case, the 
repulsive forces on a node from a cluster of nodes are approximated by a Barnes-Hut calculation 
[30], which treats them as a super-node. As the graph shows, visualising the raw data provides a 
challenging insight into security detection. The identification of anomalous behaviour for one 
device is arduous due to the volume of data present. Additionally, there is no clear differentiation 
between low-risk data, and medium to high-risk data, which may indicate a potentially malicious 
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device. Therefore, the visualisation of the data without being pre-filtered provides a limited insight 
into network behaviour; as the data is dense, with no clear indication of anomalous data points to 
be highlighted for security analysts.  
Figure 3c,d depict visualisations of data connections for the EP system at the Liverpool 
hospital. In Figure 3c the data is processed through the FrutchermanȮReingold layout algorithm, 
which simulates the graph as a system of mass particles [27]. The nodes are mass particles and the 
edges are springs between the particles. The arrows on the visualisation represent weighted edges, 
where there are two or more edges between two vertices, with the larger arrows representing more 
edges. In Figure 3d the algorithm performed on the data is the Yifan Hu Multilevel layout [26]. 
Figure 3c,d demonstrates that, at a glance, current industry standard visualisation algorithms 
cannot present the data in a meaningful way without first pre-processing the data. Advanced data 
analytics techniques would, therefore, allow the data to be filtered in such a way that the resulting 
visualisations would highlight the potential security risks more clearly in the data [31]. 
Figure 3e,f presents visualisations of data connections for the PAS system at the Liverpool 
hospital. Figure 3e displays the PAS data visualised through the ȁOpenOrd layoutȂ algorithm, 
which expects undirected weighted graphs and aims to distinguish clusters of data [29]. It is based 
on the FrutchermanȮReingold [27] algorithm. In Figure 3f, the Yifan Fu layout algorithm is applied. 
In Figure 3e,f, even with a much smaller dataset, it is shown the data is still unmanageable. It is 
unreasonable to expect the user to identify which operators are potentially high-threat, what the 
data points tell the user about the overall state of the system, and the anomalies within it. 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
 
   
(d) (e) (f) 
Figure 3. Domain controller data with ForceAtlas2 algorithm (a) and Yifan Hu Multilevel layout algorithm 
(b);electronic prescribing data with FrutchermanȮReingold layout algorithm (c) and with Yifan Hu Multilevel 
layout algorithm (d); patient administration system data with OpenOrd layout algorithm (e) and with Yifan Fu 
Multilevel layout algorithm (f). 
In order to demonstrate the interconnectivity of the three datasets, the data is combined into a 
single dataset and visualised. Figure 4 presents visualisations of data connections for the DC, EP 
and PAS systems at the Liverpool hospital. In Figure 4a, the data is visualised through the 
Future Internet 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW  12 of 24 
 
FrutchermanȮReingold layout. In Figure 4b, the OpenOrd layout algorithm is used to visualise the 
data. In Figure 4c, the Yifan Hu Multilevel layout algorithm is presented.  
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4. Full dataset with FrutchermanȮReingold algorithm (a), OpenOrd layout algorithm (b) and Yifan Hu 
Multilevel layout algorithm (c). 
The visualised data presents snapshots from three servers of the hospital networks, 
representing only a small section of the hospital network infrastructure. The hospital has currently 
274 servers, a combination of both physical and virtual servers, providing specialist applications 
and functions across the hospital network. Of these, there are 5 domain controller servers, 4 patient 
administration system servers and 2 electronic prescribing servers. With the ultimate aim of the 
process to capture snapshots at regular intervals on all the hospital servers the visualised data 
demonstrates that this is problematic due to the sheer quantity of data. Once the data has been 
visualised, interactions between the user and the visualisation itself are a challenge. For this reason, 
captured network data needs to be pre-filtered in order to simplify the visualisation and the 
visualisation process. 
4.2. Heatmaps 
In Figure 5, several heatmaps are presented, comparing frequency of local address and foreign 
address counts in the datasets. Additionally, in Figure 5, a comparison of IP addresses (converted to 
integer values) are presented. 
Calculating the integer value of an IP address is calculated by breaking the address into 4 
octets and using the following equation: ሺ݂�ݎݏݐ݋ܿݐ݁ݐ ∗ ʹͷ͸Ϳሻ + ሺݏ݁ܿ݋݊݀݋ܿݐ݁ݐ ∗ ʹͷ͸;ሻ + ሺݐℎ�ݎ݀݋ܿݐ݁ݐ ∗ ʹͷ͸ሻ + ሺ݂݋ݑݎݐℎ݋ܿݐ݁ݐሻ (7) 
Representing the data as a logarithmic heat-map is an approach for identifying data points of 
interest. Using a logarithmic scale, lower-scale values are not compressed down into the congested 
section of the graph where the unique values would be challenging to identify. However, the 
density of the dataset prohibits valuable insights from being derived. Producing a real-time 
heatmap would be inefficient, as frequencies would need to be calculated in real time. IP addresses 
would also need to be converted into integers in real time, and this is a computationally intensive 
process. Additionally, as many of the IP values are within the same range, as they are 
communicating locally within the hospital. In comparison to Figure 4, individual data points cannot 
be visualised separately, as they all fall on the same point on the heatmap, with only colour range to 
represent density. This approach is inefficient for visualising hospital network data. 
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Figure 5. Logarithmic heatmap comparing frequency of local address and foreign address counts in the 
domain controller (a), electronic prescribing (b) and patient administration system (c) servers. logarithmic 
heatmap comparing IP addresses (converted to integer values) of domain controller (d), electronic prescribing 
(e) and patient administration system (f) servers. 
4.3. Boxplots 
Figure 6 presents histograms of the most frequent items of local and foreign address values in 
the domain controller dataset. Displayed in Figure 6a the frequency for local addressesȂ on the 
domain controller is shown. The output is varied, where the most significant IP address item counts 
comprise around 4% of the local IP address ports. Of the IP addresses, 89.84% in the dataset are 
unique values. In Figure 6b, the common most value is that of an asterisk due to the port not having 
been established indicating that at this time the domain controller had approximately 11.4% of its 
ports connected is presented. 
These ports are comprised of unique values displaying the port number of the remote 
computer to which the socket is connected. In the case of this dataset, all port numbers begin with 
the IP ranges used within the hospital, which indicates that all devices connected to the domain 
controller are devices on site and hospital network. 
Figure 6c,d presents the most frequent items of local and foreign address values in the 
electronic prescribing dataset. Displayed in Figure 6c the most frequent items for local addressesȂ 
on the electronic prescribing is shown. The output is varied with the largest IP address item counts 
comprise around 7% of the local IP address ports. There are 3 sets of two value counts, with the rest 
being unique values; however, the electronic prescribing dataset is the smallest of the three 
datasets. Figure 6d depicts the most frequent value is that of an asterisk due to the port not having 
been established. 
There are comparable data patterns between the data trends in foreign address frequencies for 
the electronic prescribing data in Figure 6d and for the domain controller displayed in Figure 3b. 
Similarly, open port values such as 0.0.0.0:0 and [::]:0 are available indicating that the electronic 
prescribing had approximately 21.5% of its ports connected. This indicates both the electronic 
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prescribing and domain controller, in that at any given time, most ports are open and waiting for a 
connection. 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
   
(d) (e) (f) 
Figure 6. Domain controllerȯfrequency of local address (a) and foreign address (b), electronic prescribingȯ
frequency of local address (c) and foreign address (d), patient administration systemȯfrequency of local 
address (e) and foreign address (f). 
Figure 6e,f presents the most frequent items of the local and foreign address values in the 
patient administration system dataset. Displayed in Figure 6e the most frequent items for local 
addressesȂ on the patient administration are shown. Uniquely here, the output is largely comprised 
of a single port, accounting for almost 37% of the total local address connections. This number then 
quickly decreases and the majority of the IP addresses are unique values much like the electronic 
prescribing dataset. Figure 6f shows the most frequent value is that of the 0.0.0.0:0 port, the [::]:0 
port and the asterix due to the port not having been established indicating that at this time the 
patient administration system had approximately 54.5% of its ports connected. Again, similarly to 
the domain controller and electronic prescribing datasets, the values for the foreign address have 
more than half the ports open. This indicates that each server has a large number of open ports, 
waiting for a connection to a device. 
4.4. Sankey Diagrams 
Sankey plot for DC local. The plot shows the IP address on the left hand side (source) and the 
count of connections on the right hind side (destination). The size of each link created is correlated 
to the frequency of connection of each IP address to the server. Thus, the bigger the number of 
connections the wider the link stablished in the Sankey is. 
Table 2. Sankey diagram counts. 
IP Address Sankey Diagram Counts 
DC local 5040 31 24 4 3 2 1 
 
DC foreign 225 153 79 62 44 3 2 1 
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EPMA local 33 22 13 1 
    
EPMA foreign 6 2 1 
     
PAS local 32 24 23 14 2 1 
  
PAS foreign 64 2 1 
     
 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
Figure 7. Domain controllerȯfrequency of local address (a) and foreign address (b), electronic prescribingȯ
frequency of local address (c) and foreign address (d), patient administration systemȯfrequency of local 
address (e) and foreign address (f). 
In the following section, a discussion of the various techniques is presented, and a proposed 
algorithm for visualising the data is articulated in pseudocode. Finally, results are presented and 
discussed. 
5. Discussion and Proposed Algorithm 
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The visualisations cluster together salient points and use size to indicate potential threat levels. 
This gives the analyst a broad overview of the current network security at a glance. From here, the 
visualisation can be interacted with, explored by the analyst to investigate the data points and find 
in-depth technical information about each data point. The contribution of this paper is the 
application of the visualisation techniques to hospital network data, and the unique algorithm 
proposed in section 5.2. 
5.1. Visualisations 
Situational awareness of network data enables end users to be able to identify where further 
cyber security systems need to be put in place. In addition, identifying where best practices and 
policies can be implemented minimises the risk of a cyber-attack; such as scanning attacks, injection 
attacks and jamming attacks (as detailed in Section II, B), on highly confidential personal data.  
Through removing irrelevant data from the dataset, only pertinent and useful data is analysed. 
For example, each of the datasets used have more than half of their foreign address data points 
ȁOpenȂ, waiting for a connection to be made. When processed, this creates a large amount of 
unwanted noise in the visualisation which can be removed and potentially replaced with a figure 
representing the percentage of the dataset whose data points are open. This allows cyber security 
analysts attention to be focused on the more important, and potentially threatening data points. In 
addition to running a netstat command [32] using the command-line tool on the servers, a number 
of additional parameters were included in the command (-nab). These parameters are defined as 
follows:  -nȯThis parameter displays the active TCP connections expressed numerically (in order to 
quantify the foreign address values for visualisation purposes).  -aȯThis parameter displays all the active connections and TCP and UDP ports on which the 
server is listening.  -bȯThis parameter defines the binary (executable) program name involved in creating the 
connection or listening port. 
For each of the three datasets, four separate netstat commands were executed. The four netstat 
commands were conducted firstly without any parameters, secondly with the parameters Ȯnab, 
thirdly with the parameters Ȯb, and finally with the parameter Ȯn. The first command returns a 
dataset which attempts to determine the names of the foreign addressȂs, so that the devices which 
the servers are connected to are known. The Ȯnab command displays all TCP connections 
numerically alongside the executable involved in creating the connection. The Ȯb command 
displays TCP connections with named foreign address values. Finally the Ȯn command produces a 
clean dataset for visualisation purposes and to compare to the first three command datasets. 
Advanced data analytics techniques are used to further refine the data, removing the low-
threat data from the unique data points above. This allows cyber security analysts to focus their 
attention on only the data points that are presenting any clear potential of moderate to high level 
threat, and differentiating between the two at the within top level visualisation. These algorithms 
filter the initial datasets in order to remove noise from the visualisation in order to present salient 
points to the analyst. The analyst then explores the visualisation and marks the highlighted data as 
either safe, or as malicious and pertaining to a certain attack type. Additionally, through the use of 
information rich packet data captured at regular minute intervals, the visualisation draws from a 
wider database and highlight commonalities between them. In this case the refined visualisation 
may look more like the visualisation Figure 10b. Rather than simply showing clusters of all data, as 
the visualisation in Figure 10b does, the data has been processed and cleaned the data, so that only 
clusters with moderate to high level threats are present. As such, the visualisations further enable 
the situational awareness of network activity, over time, to become clearer. The visualisation clearly 
highlights any unidentified foreign address IP, regularly connecting to a local address IP or several 
IP addresses, for further investigation. 
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Comparing the four netstat command datasets, for each server after initially processing the 
data, enables it to become clearer. For example, with regards to the domain controller dataset, once 
the data has been processed for most frequent IP values as in Figure 9, this data can be investigated 
further. This process would identify and remove superfluous low-risk data connections in order to 
present further, refined data visualisations. Doing so would present the data without unnecessary 
noise cluttering the visualisation and leaving only the relevant and potentially malicious data 
connections highlighted for the situational awareness analysts.  
For example, with a value count of 225, representing almost 4% of the local address IP values 
are of a single IP Address open on port 445. This data point therefore, can be isolated in the four 
separate netstat command datasets to determine which foreign address devices these are 
connecting to and which processes are running, in order to determine their potential risk. Once this 
data point is isolated it becomes clear that this local IP Address is connecting to a number of 
hospital devices with the hospital prefix, and that foreign addresses that were resolving to a device 
name with a hospital device name prefix, initially suggesting that this could be ignored. The netstat 
was unable to obtain ownership information of the binary program involved in the creation of the 
connection on every value of these IP connections using the netstat Ȯb parameter. This is due to 
netstat not having the necessary administration privileges to call this information. Through the use 
of the hospitalȂs resource monitor, and checking the active TCP Connections against current 
processes with network activity, the process running on this port can be determined as the server 
message block (SMB). The SMB operates as an application-layer network protocol, which is used for 
providing shared access between nodes on a network, such as access to shared files, printers and 
serial ports. In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware campaign exploited an SMB vulnerability on 
Port 445. The exploit enabled the malware to use worm-like network propagation, encrypting files 
and demanding ransom payment, unless the system had been patched by Microsoft security 
bulletin MS17-010. The attack resulted in network downtime for 48 UK hospitals, with 6 suffering 
disruption lasting several days [7].  
5.2. Algorithm 
The pseudocode for the proposed algorithm is presented below. The aim of the algorithm is to 
remove low-risk data points, with the aim of producing medium-high risk data points to be 
visualised for the benefit of the security analyst. It performs 4 key steps to achieve this, 1) selection 
control, 2) data pre-processing, 3) data analysis, and 4) visualisation. 
Algorithm Pseudocode: Data Filtering 
Function: Remove Low-Risk Data Points 
Input: Netstat–nab data for AD, EPMA and PAS   
Output: Medium/High-Risk Data Points 
for each Data Type do 
Selection Control 
     if Data Type = AD/EPMA/PAS then 
          Forward Data 
     else 
          Temp Data Store 
     end 
Data Pre-Processing 
     if Data Type = AD/EPMA/PAS then 
          Clean Data then Temp Data Store 
     else 
          Temp Data Store 
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          Normalisation 
     end 
Data Analysis 
     for each Data Type 
     Data Optimisation then 
     Data Representation then 
     Data Evaluation then 
     end 
Visualisation 
     for each Data Type 
     Data Interpretation then 
     Data Consolidation then 
     Visualise Data in User Interface 
     end 
The algorithm is also presented visually in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. System Design Framework. 
5.3. Results 
Having isolated the foreign address values not resolving to a hospital device or server name 
with a known prefix, there were two discernible data points worth investigating further. The first is 
a connected to a device/server with a notably unusual name. While this may be benign it would still 
be worthwhile leaving in data points like this in the visualisation system, in order to highlight this 
unusual data connection to a cyber security analyst and the hospital IT team. A noteworthy factor is 
a foreign address value, to which the device name cannot be resolved by netstat; it returns an IP 
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Address. So this connection is established to the most frequent IP address value assigned by the 
domain controller. Yet the device name cannot be resolved by netstat, nor can the program which 
initiated the connection. Through filtering the data in this way, a prominent data point becomes 
apparent. 
The other most common address values present in the domain controller dataset, in Figure 9, 
have value counts of 153, 79, 62 and 44 respectively. With the exception of a value of count 3, all 
other local address IP values in the dataset have counts of 2 or fewer. The local address value with 
the count of 153 are all running the lsass.exe process. The lsass.exe process is the local security 
authority subsystem service and it verifies the validity of logons to the server, handles password 
changes and creates access tokens. It is a critical system process but is sometimes targeted by 
malware because of this. All but two of the IP address are resolving to known hospital devices. So 
these can all be categorised as low-risk connections initially and filtered from the dataset and the 
two connections with unresolved foreign address device names can be isolated and visualised for 
further investigation.  
 
Figure 9. Domain controllerȯfrequency of local address. 
The Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database is a publicly-
available database managed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [33]. It was established 
through the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 which requires sites in which medical devices are 
used to report device-related fatalities and serious adverse events to the FDA. The data has been 
publicly available since 1995. Attackers can attempt to masquerade malicious software through 
techniques such as naming their file Isass.exe (with a capital I rather than lower case l). If an lsass.exe 
file is located in a folder other than C:\Windows\system32 it can be considered malware. Anti-
malware software is a potential solution for malware security risks such as this; however in 2016 a 
medical device monitoring a patientȂs physiological data whilst undergoing a heart catheterisation 
procedure shut down and required a reboot. This caused a 5 minute delay to patient care, and was 
due to an anti-malware software performing hourly scans [34].  
The local address value with a count of 79 are all resolving to known hospital network devices 
and running the lsass.exe process. The local address value with a count of 62 are largely resolving to 
known hospital network device and running the lsass.exe process. In this case there are some more 
unusual device names being returned suggesting that it is connected to some more niche hospital 
devices and some hospital servers. There are a further 7 unresolved foreign IP address values in 
this subsection of the dataset. Finally, the local address values, with a count of 44, are primarily 
resolving to known hospital network device names. Albeit similarly to the previous count, some 
more unusual device names, and there are a further 6 unresolved foreign IP address values.  The 
process involved in creating these connections is the svchost.exe process. The svchost.exe process is 
the ȁService HostȂ and is a critical Windows component. It allows a number of services to share a 
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process in order to reduce resource consumption. Often with a number working in tandem, to 
prevent a failure in one causing a full system crash. From our research, comparable to lsass.exe, 
malicious attackers sometimes masquerade their malware to look like the svchost.exe process and, if 
it is located in a folder other than C:\Windows\system32, it can be considered malware. In addition 
to reporting the process svchost.exe the netstat Ȯb command also returns in this instance the process 
RPCSS. RPCSS are remote procedure call system services, which is a service control manager for 
servers. It performs activation requests, object exporter resolution and distributed garbage 
collection designed to make client/server interaction easier and safer by factoring out these common 
tasks. 
Of the remaining data therefore, there are no further unresolved foreign address device names, 
however these connections were initiated by some interesting and unique processes in the dataset 
on these connections and as they are running on unique local IP addresses, they have been included 
in the refined dataset for the visualisation in Figure 10. 
In Figure 10 the data is visualised again, with the data points identified as low risk, as above, 
removed from the data set to reduce noise, in addition to removing the data points of the listening 
UDP ports. It is worth noting that in the interim between running the netstat Ȯb command (the 
dataset executables, for investigation purposes), and running the netstat Ȯn command (the 
numerical dataset, for visualisation purposes), a few of the connections disconnected. Therefore 
some anomaly data connections identified in the netstat Ȯb dataset were no longer present in the 
netstat Ȯn dataset. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 10. Visualisation of domain controller dataset after noise reduction (a) and before (b) using ForceAtlas2 
algorithm. 
As these preliminary results show, the process has the capability to dramatically reduce the 
noise present in the datasets, in order to highlight the most important and potentially threatening 
data points for further investigation.  
Figures 11Ȯ13 present the local and Foreign address Sankey plots for DC, EPMA and PAS 
respectively. For the DC local results, it can be observed that the visualisation looks messy as the 
number of connections with frequency equal one over represents the remaining frequencies. 
Therefore, the following plots represent all the connection counts except those equal to one.  
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Figure 11. (a) DC local (5040, 31, 24, 4, 3 and 2) (b) DC foreign Sankey plot without count equal to one (225, 153, 
79, 62, 44, 3 and 2). 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 12. (a) EPMA local Sankey plot without count equal to one (33, 22 and 14) (b) EPMA Foreign Sankey 
plot without count equal to one (6 and 2) 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 13. (a) PAS local Sankey plot without count equal to one (32, 24, 23, 14 and 2): (b) PAS Foreign Sankey 
plot without count equal to one (64 and 1) 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
With healthcare organisations using electronic records, cyber-based transactions and mobile 
electronics, the risk of a data breach is an increasing concern. Healthcare data is intrinsically 
valuable; the repercussions of data compromise within healthcare infrastructures can range from 
loss of patient privacy and fraud, to patient injury or potentially death. Therefore, protecting 
private patient data and preventing data compromise is critically important. Visualisation can be 
used as a tool for cyber security officers within healthcare organisations to increase their situational 
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awareness of data flow and actively address this issue. Additionally, visualisation tools allow 
system operators to be proactive about cyber security within healthcare organisations. This is in 
contrast to the accepted and fundamentally flawed approach of reactivity to cyber security attacks, 
which do not attempt to address the underlying security flaws within healthcare organisations. 
In this paper, an investigation into data visualisation techniques within healthcare 
infrastructures is presented. Three real-world datasets were analysed and visualised and are 
presented as a study to demonstrate the scale of the research challenge. These datasets demonstrate 
that detecting anomalous data behaviours in healthcare infrastructures is challenging. Even once 
data has been visualised it is challenging to manage and manipulate in meaningful ways in order to 
identify irregular and anomalous data which may indicate potentially malicious behaviour and 
prevent data compromise. As more data is provided by the Liverpool-based hospital, a real-world 
practical case of an attack will be analysed, but this data is currently unavailable. Future work will 
build on the investigation into visualisation techniques for healthcare infrastructures through using 
virtual reality to explore the datasets. Complex numerical network analysis will also be explored. 
Additionally, future work will involve the use of machine learning data filtering techniques to 
simplify the visualisation of normal network traffic. This will facilitate understanding patterns of 
data behaviours and highlight abnormal data behaviours in the network, which are the result of an 
attack taking place using machine learning algorithms.  
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